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Abstract
The principal conclusion of this paper is that the generic pattern for the optimal
income tax schedule is that of a monotonically rising marginal tax rate. The
belief that the marginal rate should decline to zero at the upper end of the
scale is not supported. The results hold for high and low elasticities of labor-
leisure substitution, and for additive as well as strictly concave welfare functions.
Differences between the conclusions of this paper and those of previous writers
are due primarily to the formulation of the optimizing problem and detailed
interpretation and analysis of the solution, rather than to differences between
the underlying models, although these exist.
October, 1994
•'•The revisions do not affect the substance of the paper, but there is a a more careful
upfront discussion of the differences between this approach and the more traditional one.
1. Introduction
Determining the income tax schedule is one of the most important public policy
decisions made by modern governments, full of major political and economic
consequences. Myths abound, yet the contributions of economists to date have
tended to be incomplete or inconclusive, even confusing. The purpose of the
present paper is to re-examine the problem, which has lately been neglected.
Mirrlees (1971), in his seminal paper on optimal income tax with labor-leisure
substitution, concluded that the optimal marginal tax rate would be everywhere
in the range (0,1) but that ' . . . i t is not possible to say in general whether
marginal tax rates should be higher for high-income, low-income, or intermediate
income groups'. For a specific model he choose as an example, he found the
tax to be nearly linear, with marginal rates tending to fall rather than rise.
Because of the relative ease of solution, much work has been done on properties
of optimal linear income taxes. Examples include Sheshinski (1972), Itsumi
(1974), Romer (1976), Stern (1976), Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Helpman
and Sadka (1978), but these throw only faint light on the shape of more general
tax functions. However Sheshinski (1989) solved for an optimal two-bracket
piecewise linear tax and showed that the marginal rate for the higher bracket
was at least as great as that for the lower, thereby suggesting that nondecreasing
marginal rate might be optimal in general.
However it has been argued that the marginal tax rate should be zero at the top
end of an income distribution of finite range, a result clearly not consistent with
a monotonic nondecreasing marginal rate. Versions of this argument appear in
Phelps (1973), Sadka (1976), Stern (1976), Seade (1977), Cooter (1978), and
Weymark (1987). This proposition is not supported by the results given here.
Since belief in the zero marginal tax proposition is widely held1, largely because
of an appealing intuitive argument apparently in its favor, the Appendix to the
paper is devoted to a brief analysis of why the argument fails to hold.
In the optimal income tax problem, the policymaker must set an income tax
schedule t(z) which optimizes his view of community welfare, given that indi-
vidual households react to the schedule by choosing levels of taxable activity
which optimize their private well-being. It is this problem of incentive compat-
ibility that makes the determination of the optimal income tax inherently more
difficult than that of choosing an optimal wealth or endowment tax, assuming
full information about households in both cases. In addition to the compound
optimization, the problem has other complications:
• The population has a "natural" distribution in terms of resources and/or
skills as independent variable, but the solution is the tax as a function of
income. The relationship between a household's optimal income and its
endowment depends, however, on the tax function, which is the unknown.
1Slemrod (1990), p.164, is a representative expression of both the belief and the discomfort
with it.
• Since we are interested in the shape of the optimal tax schedule, we must
avoid imposing prior restrictions that directly influence it2. Furthermore,
it is not sufficient merely to determine the sign of the marginal tax rate3 —
we cannot consider the problem solved unless we can provide reasonable
clues as to its direction of change, which requires analysis beyond the first
order optimal conditions.
2. The Policy Problem
The policymaker's problem is to raise per capita revenue of g to be redistributed
uniformly as a grant g in cash or any other form in which it is a perfect substi-
tute for market goods. The revenue is to be obtained from a tax defined by a
smooth continuous function t(z) > 0, where z is market income, but otherwise
unrestricted. It is assumed that #, if paid in cash, is not taxable. The tax
function is to be chosen so as to maximize mean welfare, given the distribu-
tion of population, predetermined social welfare function, and the behavior of
households.
Two cases will be considered:
1. Limited redistribution. The per capita grant g is given, and the income
tax must raise the required revenue in an optimal way.
2. Full redistribution. The tax-grant combination (g,t(z)) should solve the
optimal redistribution problem, the value of g being part of the solution.
The Welfare Function
The welfare function G(v) adopted by the policymaker is assumed to be anony-
mous and based solely on the level of a household's optimized utility level v,
full analysis of which is given in the next section. At this stage it is sufficient to
note that households are assumed to have identical preferences between market
and nonmarket income and to face identical trade-offs between the two, but to
differ in endowments to. Utility optimized with respect to g and t(z) can be
regarded as a single valued function of either w or 2 provided the optimum is
interior. The policymaker is assumed to have full information as to the effect of
the tax function on household utility, if only in "black box" form. We assume
G'(v) > 0 and consider both additive (G" = 0) and strictly concave ( G" < 0)
cases.
The population of households is modelled as a one dimensional continuum and
the social objective is to maximize the mean value of G(v) over this population.
Fair (1971), uses a nonlinear tax but restricts it to a specific form £(z) = o log(l -+- z),
with only one parameter.
Shown to be positive or nonnegative over a wide class of models. See Mirrlees (1971),
Phelps (1973), Roell (1985), Romer (1976), Seade (1982), among others.
Inadequacy of the Traditional Approach
The welfare criterion is the mean value of G(v) taken over the whole population.
Since the "natural" index variable is the endowment v, with distribution given
by a smooth density function <j){<jj) over (0 < U)Q,U)\ < oo), it would seem that
the optimizing problem should be set up in the form
max / G(v(g,t{-),u))<j){u))du}
This has been the traditional approach.
In order to take care of incentive compatibility in this approach, households are
assumed to optimize with respect to tax as a function of income. The optimal
schedule for tax is determined in terms of a?, using standard variational methods,
then converted into a function of income, using the optimal relationship between
u) and z. This fails to attain the desired result, for the following reasons:
• It is of the essence of the variational method that the unknown function,
t{-) in this case, is determined as a trajectory of the index variable, and
all variations are from that trajectory. If u> is the index variable, then the
solution gives t(u) and the solution is an optimal endowment tax, not an
income tax.
• It is true that, once the variational problem is solved to give t*(tj), house-
hold optimization under well behaved conditions (interior solutions) gives
a unique mapping (w,t*(u})) *-* z. Prom this we can then write down
• But the t*(z) so found is not an income tax schedule. It is an endow-
ment tax schedule converted ex post to list taxes by the incomes of the
households rather than their endowments.
• During the optimization itself households are confronting an endowment
based tax. Variations in t(uj) will cause variations in z, but those sec-
ondary variations in z will not have any effect on the household's tax.
The rate dt*(z)/dz shows the progressivity from household to household
with different market incomes, but not the true marginal trade-off for an
individual household.
An Inverse Approach
The solution adopted here is to treat income as the index variable and take the
income distribution as given. Under circumstances which give interior solutions
for household optimization, there is a unique positive monotonic relation be-
tween u) and 2, so that the final distribution of 2, given the tax function, will be
associated with a well defined distribution of a;. This approach is acceptable here
since the purpose of the present analysis is to derive generic properties of the
tax function, not to solve for an actually specified initial wealth distribution4.
Boundary cases can also be handled, with care.





where f(z) is the density function on income. Solving by variational methods
gives the unknown tax function correctly as a trajectory t(z) over incomes. We
can note the following properties of interior solutions of the optimizing process:
• Let t*(z) be the tax function found to be optimal for the income distribu-
tion f{z). This gives a mapping (f(z), t*(z)) *-* 4>*{u>{z)) which associates
with the initial income distribution a well defined distribution of endow-
ments such that
1. Each household with endowment cu(z) will choose to produce income
z under the tax system t*(z).
2. The tax system t*(z) maximizes the community welfare measure,
given the grant level g.
• There is no difficulty with incentive compatibility since the variational
problem finds t as a function of z and households correctly perceive t as a
function of their own choice of z.
• That is, if we started with an endowment distribution <f)*(uj(z)) and and a
tax system t*(z), each household would choose income z, giving an income
distribution f(z) for which t*(z) has been shown to be optimal.
• Such a tax structure and a mapping f(z) i-» </>*(u;*) can be found for every
choice of f(z) for which interior solutions exist for both the household and
aggregate optimization problems. That is, for every (acceptable) choice
of f(z) we find t*(z) and <f>*{w*).
• In principle, the determination of the optimal tax structure given the dis-
tribution of endowments can be found in the manner of the reverse tele-
phone directory — find the optimal tax functions for all acceptable income
distributions, then search through the list of associated endowment distri-
butions for the one given. It may not be there, however, since there will
be endowment distributions which do not correspond to interior solutions.
3. Households
Before proceeding to the formal solution of the main problem, we need to es-
tablish certain relevant properties of household behavior.
4In any case, real available data are available for the distribution on z, but not on ui
Households are assumed to have identical neoclassical utility functions u(x, C),
where x is disposable market income made up of earned market income z less
tax t(z) on that income, plus any "grant" g from the government, and £ is
nonmarket income (including leisure). Only resource endowments u>, which are
measured in efficiency units, vary between households. The endowments, which
can include human capital and financial resources, can be transformed by the
individual into either market or nonmarket income at a constant 1:1 rate of
transformation. Thus x = z — t(z) + g and £ = u; — z.
This formulation is different and perhaps slightly more general than the more
traditional one in which resources, measured in units such as time, do not vary
between households, but there are skill or wage differences which determine the
rate of transformation into market income. In the present formulation, higher
skill is reflected in a higher endowment in efficiency units and a consequent
increased ability to generate nonmarket income ("quality leisure", home pro-
duction, tax avoidance, for example) as well as market income.
The household is assumed to optimize its choice between market and non-market
income, subject to a budget constraint which includes the tax function. For-
mally:
max u(z — t(z) + g, u — z), subject to: LJ > z > 0 (1)
Z
with solution
It will be shown that the upper end optimum, z = u; does not occur.
To obtain the most clearcut results, we want to investigate the optimal tax
schedule for a continuum of households with identical utility functions but dif-
fering endowment levels. We want to separate, as far as possible, labor-leisure
substitution effects from income and other effects. The general neoclassical
function does not provide easily observable separation of effects5. In addition
to the usual strict quasiconcavity, desirable properties for the utility function
are:
1. Homotheticity, so that there is no changing preference bias toward either
market or nonmarket income as utility increases.
2. Linearity in income with prices constant, so that diminishing marginal
utility of income effects, if any, appear as an assumption of the policy-
maker.
We shall confine our analysis to a CES utility function6, which meets the above
A first version of this paper was written in terms of such a function.
Feldstein (1973) uses the same utility function in conjunction with a nonlinear transfor-
mation relationship, but reaches no well defined conclusion as to the general shape of the
optimal tax function.
specifications:
{ Y ^ O ^ ) ~ (2)
where 0 < a < 1 and a > 0, ^ 1.
Choice of the CES function, rather than the much simpler Cobb-Douglas, pre-
empts queries as to whether the results depend on unit elasticity of substitution.
However we will sometimes use the equivalent Cobb-Douglas form when it is de-
sirable to show that a particular result holds also for unit elasticity.
Household Optimization
Households are assumed to choose z optimally, subject to 0 < z < u>, given g
and the tax function t(z). At an interior optimum
where b = ((1 — a)/a). An interior optimum will exist for iv > (6/(1 — t'(0)))a g,
a lower boundary optimum (z = 0) otherwise. There is no upper boundary
optimum (z — cu). The above relationships also holds for a = 1.
Note that a particular household's marginal choice is based on just two prop-
erties of the tax function, the total tax t(z*) at its optimal income and the
marginal tax rate m(z*) = t'(z*) at that income. For a household at income
level z, the tax function can be seen as fully represented by these two variables
(parameters, from its point of view)7.
Given the tax structure (g,t(z)), there is a strictly monotonic one-to-one map-
ping between the endowment level co and the optimal market income z, provided
the household is at an interior optimum.
with 0 < dco/dz < oo for all m < 1.
Thus the welfare level associated with an optimizing household facing tax func-
tion (g,t(z)). can be written as either v(z,g,t(z)) or v(v,g,t(z)) From the
point of view of the policy maker, the optimizing household can be regarded as
a "black box" with a control knob t(x) (assuming g fixed) , an indicator dial
But note that m' appears in the second order condition:
so that (Pu/dz2 < 0 for all positive m', but only for a limited range of negative m1.
v, and two input/output connections z, w. Holding u constant and varying
t(z) gives different readings for v and different outputs z. Likewise, holding z
constant and varying t(z) gives different readings for v and for u>. But if z gives
v and u> for a given tax function t(z), then u> gives v and z for the same tax
function.
Effect of Parameter Variations
For given z, we can treat t, m as parameters with respect to marginal household
decisions rather than functions and write the optimized utility level as
' (z - t + g) (5)
where c= aa^a~l\
The effect of varying the tax parameters is given by:
Jg = C f 1
vt = -vg<0 (7)
provided z — t + g > 0. The same sign relationships are easily shown to hold for
the Cobb-Douglas case (a = 1).
Note that vm is positive because, with z held constant, a higher marginal tax
rate requires a higher endowment level for that market income, which implies
higher nonmarket income and higher utility. This relationship holds for all
neoclassical functions, since vm = (1 — m)ui2juyi in the general case.
4. The Solution
Taking the index variable to be z, with distribution defined by the density
function f(z) and range (20, 1^)) the problem can be written as
rZ\
maxW(g) = / G (v(g,t(z), rn(z), z)) f(z) dz (9)
Jzo
where the maximand is the mean welfare of the population.
The solution8 must satisfy the differential equations
t'(z) = m{z) (10)
*'(*) = t(z)f(z) (11)
Kaneko (1981) proved the existence of a solution to the optimal tax problem for a quasi-
concave utility function with a strictly concave conversion of leisure into income, and a positive
monotonic welfare function, but not for a continuous distribution. Existence is assumed here.
and end-point conditions
t(zo) = 0 (12)
i(*i) free (13)
R(z0) = 0 (14)
R(zi) = 9 (15)
R(z) is the contribution to net revenue per capita from taxes through income
level 2, with R{z\) is the mean revenue over all taxpayers. The constraint
t(zo) — 0 is added to permit limited redistribution, otherwise the program will
always solve for the optimal redistribution level via the level of t(zo).
The control variable is m, state variables are t, R, giving the Hamiltonian
H(g, t(z), m(z), X(z),^(z)) = G (v(g, t, m, z)) f{z) + \{z)m{z) + n(z) t(z) f(z)
Using standard maximum principle methods, an interior optimal trajectory for
the state variables t(z),R(z) and associated costate variables X(Z),/J,(Z), must
satisfy the first order maximum condition
Hm=Gmf + \ = 0 (16)
Since t'(z) — m(z) and t(zo) = 0, the optimal solution is fully described by
m*(z), the optimal marginal tax rate schedule. However the properties and
economic interpretation of the optimal costate variables A*(z) and n*(z) are
critical in establishing the properties of the optimal tax schedule.
Henceforth it will be assumed that all variables are at optimal values unless it
is clear otherwise, so the asterisks will be dropped except that W* will always
be used to identify the optimal redistribution solution.
The Costate Variables
The costate variables must satisfy the adjoint equations
A' = -Ht = -(Gt + fi)f (17)
\i = —HR = 0 ==» n constant (18)
but we need further analysis to determine some important properties.
We can write
W{g) = / [H - Xt' - nR'\ dz
J Zo
[H + A t -\- [i R] dz
ZQ
after integration by parts and substituting g — R(z\).
Varying the end values t(zo), t(zi), R(0), gives:
6W(g) = /
Jzo
-\(z1)6t(z1) + fi6R(0) (19)





Since t is essentially unconstrained at z\, dW(g)/dt(zi) must vanish so that
: 0 (23)
From (17) this implies that either f{z\) = 0 (density tails to zero at the top) or
Gm(zi) = 0 which implies a noninterior optimum for the upper end household.
However t(zo) is not unconstrained in this way, since g was specifically intro-
duced so that we could fix t(zo) = 0. Thus dW(g)/dt(zo) need not vanish and
there is no direct transversality restriction on A(ZQ)-
Interpretation of the Costates
The economic interpretation of the costate variables A (z) and p, is important
in understanding the model and in unravelling the story told by the optimal
conditions.
Since \i = dW(g)/dR(Q), it measures the effect on optimal mean welfare of a
marginal variation in the starting value of the cumulated revenue R(z). R{z{) is
fixed at g, so that /i is the value in mean welfare terms of an exogenous addition
of $1 to the revenue "pot", enabling the tax function to be optimally reworked
to collect a mean of $1 less from taxpayers. The reason /z is constant is that
only the final revenue is relevant, not the stage at which it is collected. It is
obvious that \i is essentially positive.
Interpretation of \{z) is less straightforward. Since \{z§) — dW(g)/dt(zo),
X(zo) measures the effect on mean welfare of raising the lowest tax bracket from
zero to $1 and then re-optimizing. Since other parameters (g in particular) are
held constant, taxes will be reduced for at least some incomes above the lowest
and the distribution will become marginally more regressive. If t(zo) — 0 was
9
itself an optimal outcome, then we would have A(20) = 0, but since t(zo) = 0 is
an imposed constraint, the value (or even the sign) of A (zo) is not immediate.
We can, however, argue as follows:
1. If g is set at below the optimal redistribution level g* and the constraint
t(zo) = 0 is removed, the program will optimally redistribute by making t(zo)
negative. This implies A(zo) < 0 if t(zo) — 0 and g < g*.
2. If g > g* is above the optimal redistribution level, the opposite will be
true and thus A(20) > 0- As we will show in Property P2 below, we cannot
have X(ZQ) > 0 and thus there is no regular solution for the case g > g*. This
is because we can only optimize mean welfare in this case by increasing t(zo)
above zero, which the constraints do not permit.
The interpretation of A (z) for z > zo is that it represents the effect of an
exogenously imposed change of $1 in the tax at income z on the mean welfare
of those with incomes above z, after re-optimization for those households only.
Note that one of the influences on the value of A (z) will be f(z) since an increase
in the tax on a sparsely populated income bracket will call for little readjustment
elsewhere. We expect to find A(z) < 0 except at the ends since, if we interrupt
the program at z and restart to optimize only from that point on, the prior tax
at z is now too high because it was designed to contribute to households with
incomes lower than z.
Optimal Redistribution
The optimal solution to the redistribution problem is found by treating g as a
control parameter and optimizing for it:
W* = maxW(g)
9
Since W(g) is continuous in g for g < g*, we can take the derivative from below
to find the optimal condition
dW(g)
ZQ
Prom the adjoint equation we have
H9 = Ggf = -°tf = A' + 11 f
so that
?zx






Since \{z\) — 0, dW(g)/dg — —A(zo) and so the optimal condition is
O (25)




Prom (3), ZQ > 0 only if UQ > v(g) = bag/(l - m(zo))a, since t(zo) = 0. If
UJQ < u>(g), households with endowments in the set ft = {a;|a;o < u <u(g)} will
not attain an interior optimum, so that z = 0 for all iv € ft.
Since o>(^ ) is increasing in 5, the set is nonempty for sufficiently high levels of
redistribution (values of g) and for all g > 0 if u;o = 0. Since z — 0 for all a; € ft,
the mapping between the distributions of CJ and z is not one-to-one in this range
as it is for interior optima.
Provided UJO < co(g), define f3 as the proportion of the population in ft. Since /3
depends on the endowment distribution of the population as well as g, we shall
treat it as part of the assumed market income distribution.
The tax schedule is irrelevant to households in ft, the effect of redistribution
policy being determined by g, which becomes their entire disposable income.
Individual welfare is u{g,to), (we do not use the v notation, since these are not
interior optima). Write the mean welfare of the population in the set as G°(g).
The policymaker's optimizing problem now has the form
max W(g) = f * G (v{g, t(z), m(z), z)) f(z) dz + /3G°(g) (26)
For given g, the last term is simply a constant and only the integral term is
to be maximized. However there are three differences from the problem in the
interior optimum case
1. zo = 0
2. f*1f(z)dz=l-P
3. R(zi) = g/{1-P)
The last is because the taxpayers must accumulate enough revenue to distribute
g over those in ft as well as themselves.
When we allow for the above changes and for the term in G°(g), the effect of
varying g can be shown to become
( l l ^ m (27,
dg V 1 - / ? d9
Consider the second term on the right. dG°/dg and p are both positive compa-
rable numbers, each measuring the effect of $1 on mean welfare, dG°/dg over
households in ft, \i over the remainder. Because of the large weight given to \i
(between 2 and oo), we expect this to dominate and the expression in paren-
theses to be positive. Thus for optimal redistribution (dW(g)/dg = 0) we will
have A(0) < 0 rather than = 0 as in the interior optimum. Note that putting
/3 = 0 gives the interior optimum results.
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5. Properties of the Optimal Trajectory
The problem at this point is to translate the various necessary conditions for
that trajectory into a meaningful description of the required tax function. It is
first necessary to establish certain properties of the optimal solution.
P I . n > 0.
This follows directly from dW*/dR(0) = \i. An exogenous increase in revenue
will necessarily increase mean welfare.
P2. For an interior optimum, of the policymaker's problem, \{z) < 0 for all z,
and A(z) = 0 only if f(z) = 0 or z is a boundary optimum for the household.
For an interior optimum to the main problem X(z) = — Gm(z)f(z) from (16).
An interior optimum for the household implies Gm(z) — G' vm > 0, from (8),
and f(z) > 0, so \(z) < 0 certainly and = 0 only if f(z) = 0. At a boundary
optimum for the household, Gm(z) = 0, so f(z) = 0 is no longer a necessary
condition.
P3. A'(2) > 0 (< 0) only if (a) Gg > \i (< \i) and (b) either d(Gm)/dz < 0 (>
0) or f'(z) < 0 (> 0)
The adjoint equation (17) can be expressed as
\'(z)=(Gg(z)-rif(z) (28)
since Gt = G'vt = —G'vg = —Gg(z), from (7). Condition (a) follows im-
mediately, and (b) follows directly from the first order optimum condition
A(z) = -Gm(z)f(z).
P4. Along any optimal trajectory in which all households are at interior optima,
Gg > 11, where Gg is the frequency weighted average of Gg along the trajectory.
Unless Gg(z) is constant, maxG^z) > \i > minG^z). However if there is a
lower boundary optimum (the set Q, is nonempty), it is possible to have Gg(z) >
\i for all z.
From (28) above, we obtain
JZQ
(Gg(z)-ii) f(z)dz = A(z!)-A(z0)
ZQ
Gg-ii = -A(z o)>0 (29)
since X(z\) vanishes and X(zo) < 0 (from P2).
Now n = 8W(g)/dRo is the increase in mean social welfare which would result
from an exogenous increase of $1 in per capita revenue, after optimally redis-
tributing the resulting saving in taxes. Gg(z) measures the social valuation of
the effect of $1 on a single household with income z.
For an interior optimum, $1 saved in taxes is equivalent to $1 increase in g. It
follows that we must have // > Gg(z) for some z, since pi is the optimal mean
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welfare from an increase of $1 per capita. On the other hand, we must have
Gg{z) > \i for some z, otherwise the optimum would be a Pareto improvement,
which is impossible for a pure redistribution without externalities.
For a lower boundary optimum, however, $1 saved in taxes is equivalent to
only $ (1 — P) increase in g for the taxpayers, due to the payments to those
in the set (l. While it is true that \i > (1 — j3)Gg(z) for some z by the same
argument as above, this is consistent with Gg(z) > n everywhere for a large
enough fi <E (0,1).
P 5 . dGg(z)/dz < 0 unless m'(z) > 0. / / G" = 0, m'{z) > 0 implies
dGg{z)/dz > 0, but if G" < 0, dGg(z)/dz > 0 only if m'(z) is sufficiently
large relative to \G"/G'\.
We have
G { ) { ) (30)
The second term is negative and its magnitude depends on the degree of con-
cavity \G"(u)/G'(u)\. If the welfare function is additive, the term vanishes and
dGg/dz = dvg/dz.
From (6) derive
<^__^A, h° \^ ™'
 (31)
dz \ (\-m)°-1) (\-m)a
so that dvg/dz has the same sign as m'. Note that this result holds for both
a > 1 and 0 < a < 1, and a similar result can be shown to hold for a — 1.
P 6 . dGm(z)/dz > 0 unless m' < 0 or G" < 0.
Using (8):
dvm b°Q^ L . A . ba \ (z-t + aWI
{61)dz
where
1+ 1 + (1-m)2
so that vm is certainly increasing when m is nondecreasing, although it may not
be decreasing when m is decreasing.
The relationship between dGm/dz and dvm/dz is essentially the same as was
shown in (30) above between dGg/dz and dvg/dz. That is, Gm and vm move
in the same direction with additive welfare, but welfare concavity introduces a
downward bias to dGm/dz which increases with the degree of concavity.
P 7 . Either m(z) < 1 and t(z) < z for all z > 0 or t(z) = 0 for all z.
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From (3), z > 0 only if m(z) < 1 when g > 0. But t(z) > 0 implies g = 0 if and
only if t(z) = 0 everywhere. Since t(zo) = 0, m < 1 everywhere implies t(z) < z
everywhere.
6. Basic Propositions
Proposition I. Any solution to the optimal redistributee income tax problem in
which all households are at interior optima will be characterized by a marginal
tax rate which is rising (but always < I), the rate of rise being greater, the greater
the degree of concavity of the welfare function. For a sufficiently concave welfare
function, no solutions exist with all households at interior optima. These results
are independent of the elasticity of substitution between market and nonmarket
income, but hold only for income distributions characterized by falling income
density at the upper end with f(z) —• 0 as z —• z\.
For optimal redistribution, g = g* and \{ZQ) = A(zi) = 0, as shown earlier.
Now X(z) < 0 for ZQ < z < z\ from P2 and the assumptions on / (z) , so that
the graph of A(z) must look like a slack clothesline, first falling from the zero
level then rising back to it. Thus A'(z) must first be negative, then positive.
From P3, this requires Gg(z) < \x initially, then > /z, so Gg(z) must be rising.
From P5, a necessary condition for this is m'(z) > 0, whatever the elasticity of
substitution. This condition also sufficient if the welfare function is additive,
but if it is strictly concave m'(z) must not only be positive, but of sufficient
magnitude to outweigh the negative concavity term. However, m(z) < 1 even
at z\, from P7.
From P3, A'(z) > 0, which characterises the latter part of the trajectory, requires
either f'(z) < 0 or falling Gm at that stage. But Gm is rising since m'(z) > 0,
from P6. f'(z) < 0 is consistent with the transversality requirement A(zi) = 0,
which can only be satisfied if f(zy) — 0 from P2.
If the concavity of the welfare function is such that Gg is falling throughout,
even if m' > 0, then it must be true that Gg > u at the beginning and < // at
the end, so that A is first rising, then falling. But an interior optimum requires
A first falling, then rising, and so cannot be
attained with this degree of concavity.
Although the pattern of the optimal tax is independent of the value of a, the
upper bound to values of m for which z > 0, varies inversely with a (from
(3)). Thus there is a presumption (but not a proof) that the optimal path of
m(z) will be lower, the higher the elasticity of substitution between market and
nonmarket income.
Proposition la. The conclusions of Proposition I hold for the problem of
optimizing the tax schedule given the level of g, provided g < g*.
If g < g*, X(ZQ) < 0 rather than = 0. An interior optimum requires A'(z) > 0
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and thus Gg > \i in the final phase, while the phase with Gg < fj, must precede
it. Thus the pattern is essentially the same as in optimal redistribution. As
already pointed out, there is no interior optimum solution if g > g*.
Proposition II. If the degree of welfare concavity is too high to give an interior
optimum, optimal redistribution will give a lower boundary solution. It will be
optimal for those with the lowest endowments to produce no market income9.
Like the interior optimum, this will be characterized by a rising marginal tax
rate.
If the degree of welfare concavity is so high that Gg(z) is falling, then an interior
optimum does not exist because this implies Gg(z) < n{z) and thus falling X(z)
near z\, where A(z) must be rising. But from P4 it is possible to have Gg(z) > //
everywhere for a lower boundary optimum (/? > 0), so that Gg(z) > fj,, hence
X(z) rising near z±, is consistent with falling Gg(z).
Since we must have minGg < fi/(l — /?), the condition minG^ > \i can always
be satisfied for large enough f3 € (0,1). However there is an efficiency loss
at the lower boundary because the households are not able to reach an interior
optimum, so it is clear that the optimal solution will keep j3 as small as possible.
Since Gg is falling, this implies the rate of fall should kept small. From P5, this
implies m(z) rising.
Since Gg{z) > n throughout, X(z) will be rising throughout. This is consistent
with X(z0) < 0 and A (21) = 0.
Thus the optimal trajectory for high welfare concavity will be a lower boundary
optimum with the least endowed households receiving g as their only disposable
income, generating no market income of their own but using all their resources
for nonmarket income. As in the interior optimum case, the marginal tax rate
will be rising.
High concavity implies Gm(z) will be falling throughout, which is consistent
with X(z) falling thoughout (P3), so no restrictions on f(z) are necessary. It
must still be true that X(z\) = 0, however.
7. Concluding Remarks
The principal conclusion of this paper is that the generic pattern for the optimal
income tax schedule is that of a monononically rising marginal tax rate. This
is a kind of deja vue result, since it is what would have been expected prior to
the optimal tax literature of the 1970's and 1980's. That literature came to be
dominated by the top end zero marginal rate proposition, even though it often
seemed to be inconsistent with what the main optimization was indicating. The
proposition, which seemed to rule out precisely what this paper concludes, was
due to a misinterpretation of the formal results of optimization. Indeed, the
3
 A somewhat similar solution appears in Mirrlees (1971)
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special contribution of this paper lies most of all in the careful interpretation
of the optimum conditions, a somewhat Sherlock Holmesian process in which
every single mathematical property of the optimal trajectory, together with its
economic interpretation, is fitted into its place in the puzzle.
The generic pattern holds for all positive elasticities of substitution between
market and nonmarket income (or consumption and leisure), although we can
expect (this is not formally proved in the paper) that the optimal marginal
tax rate will be lower throughout the trajectory when the elasticity is higher.
The pattern holds for simple additive welfare functions as well as those with
strict concavity, but increased concavity will be associated with a more rapidly
rising marginal rate. Sufficiently concave welfare functions, and endowment
distributions with sufficient concentration at the low end, will make it optimal
to have bottom end households generate no market income.
The analysis has been confined to interior optima except at the bottom end of
the distribution, and is thus restricted to income (hence endowment) distribu-
tions in which density tails off to zero at the upper end. While this conforms




The Top End Marginal Rate
The proposition that the marginal tax rate should be zero on the highest income
is not supported by the present analysis. This appendix is designed to show
why common arguments do not hold for smooth neoclassical utility functions
and smooth continuous tax functions.
We shall consider the informal intuitive argument, and make notes on some
formal arguments.
The Informal Argument
This can be stated as follows10: If z is the highest market income under a
tax system in which m(z) > 0, there is no welfare loss, and there may be a
gain, from changing the upper end tax schedule so that m(z) = fh = 0. The
reasoning is that the individual at z retains his original choice, but has an
expanded opportunity because of the lowered marginal tax rate, so he cannot
lose and may gain, while his tax contribution remains unchanged at t(z) so that
other taxpayers are left unaffected even if he gains.
There is a counterargument, however: If the upper end individual has an actual
gain, it is because he can move to a preferred position with income z > z, and
this will always be true for a smooth neoclassical utility function and an interior
equilibrium. Consider the situation after the change, and now impose tax on
income above z at a marginal rate m in the range 0 < m < fh. The top end
individual will be worse off that with m — 0, but his optimal income will be
greater than z, so that he will pay more than t(fh) which can be redistributed to
give a welfare gain to other taxpayers. Is overall welfare increased or decreased?
It is precisely the function of the optimizing program to determine this. Thus
the upper end marginal rate may or may not be zero, but this can be determined
only from the total trajectory, not from an informal argument concerning the
top end in isolation.
Formal Arguments
Other versions of the optimal tax analysis are not directly comparable with
that given here, primarily because of the use of endowments, skill, or the wage
rate, as the index variable. However, a detailed study of two in which the
analysis was in control theory format shows that the condition that the density
approach zero at the top end, shown to be necessary for an interior optimum
in the present analysis, is sufficient to satisfy the upper transversality condition
even with m > 0.
10There are several variations on this argument, including a geometrical version in Seade
(1977). The version here is the simplest
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In Phelps (1971), for example, this condition takes the form
™>f<j>m — 0 (from Equation (iii) of Appendix)
where / is the density and 0 is the inversion of the optimal income function.
This is satisfied, as in our analysis by / = 0 and/or <j>m = 0, a non-interior
household optimum.
In Cooter (1978), the transversality condition ((iii) on p. 759) can be put in the
form
where A is the costate variable associated with aggregate tax revenue (corre-
sponding to our fi, and essentially positive), \i here is the costate associated
with v, the indirect utility as a state variable. The argument is that \i is zero
at the end (since v is unconstrained) and this implies T' = 0. However, if / = 0
then any value of T'- is consistent with \i — 0.
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